I had to look to Georgia's Supreme Court to find some "local" caselaw on the subject. Georgia's defintion of hunting was close to being the same combination of words used by our legislature to describe hunting and the "defintion" found in the front of the Regulation Book with nothing showing it was adopted as a rule.
The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled in part, "Defendant's objection that the trial court's instruction to the jury defining "hunting" was vague and overbroad and therefore erroneous is valid and he is entitled to a new trial." Alabama's courts often look to other states when there is a lack of existing caselaw for statutes in our state.
In it's discussion of the case, the Georgia Supreme Court found the defendant's argument to be persuasive, and I am in agreement:
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Defendant urges that the word "pursue" would make criminal the act of a photographer in following wildlife for the purpose of photographing it. The word "pursue" may mean "chase" or "follow," Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary (1980). On the other hand, the word "pursue," in the context in which it is used here, may mean: to seek or search for wildlife, for the purpose of shooting or capturing such wildlife. See Funk & Wagnalls, supra, "hunt." We find that this latter meaning was the one intended by the General Assembly. OCGA § 1-3-1 (a).
Defendant also urges that the words "disturbing, harrying, or worrying" render the definition of hunting overbroad, and thereby inclusive of innocent conduct, because many people who are not hunting wildlife nevertheless may disturb, harry or worry them. However, as we did above, we find that the General Assembly intended those words to be limited to situations in which the accused was "disturbing, harrying, or worrying" wildlife for the purpose of shooting or capturing them.
SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA September 5, 1985 Trammell Grady Shirley v. State
It is my belief that someone walking back to their truck after hunting may be looking around them to merely see if there is wildlife present with no intent of shooting or capturing that wildlife. Absent evidence that they were in an act of attempting to kill or capture that wildlife, there is no justifiable conclusion that they were hunting for the purposes of 9-11-257. Otherwise, for example, we would all be guilty of hunting from a road if we see deer in a field, slow down to watch them, and as a result scare them away. Or, even if you are walking back to your truck on a WMA and on a railroad right of way, you see deer and stop to watch them, taking no action whatsoever to catch or kill them.
Simply watching wildlife is an important part of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. You aren't necessarily hunting when you do that. People do it all the time.
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A basic rule of review in criminal cases is that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of those persons sought to be subjected to their operation, i.e., defendants. Schenher v. State, 38 Ala. App. 573, 90 So.2d 234, cert. denied, 265 Ala. 700, 90 So.2d 238 (1956).
Penal statutes are to reach no further in meaning than their words. Fuller v. State, 257 Ala. 502, 60 So.2d 202 (1952).
One who commits an act which does not come within the words of a criminal statute, according to the general and popular understanding of those words, when they are not used technically, is not to be punished thereunder, merely because the act may contravene the policy of the statute. Fuller v. State, supra, citing Young's Case, 58 Ala. 358 (1877).
No person is to be made subject to penal statutes by implication and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to predominate in favor of the accused. Fuller v. State, supra.
A statute defining a crime must be strictly construed and "one cannot commit an offense under a statute except in the circumstances it specifies." Peinhardt v. State, 161 Ala. 70, 49 So. 831, 832 (1909), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. State, 177 Ala. 34, 58 So. 921, 923 (1912).
